Environmental Defense Institute

Troy, Idaho

            

Comments 

on

Revised Proposed Plan

Test Area North

at the

Idaho National Engineering

&

Environmental Laboratory

 

 

Submitted by

Chuck Broscious

On behalf of the Environmental Defense Institute

May 2003

 

                                                                                     

 

    

I.  Summary

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Revised Proposed Plan for Waste Area Group 1 - Test Area North (TAN) dated November 1998 [1]  and the New Proposed April 2003 remediation Plan [2]  contain major discrepancies with the Comprehensive Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Investigation Report data and other internal INEEL waste characterization report data on TAN. [3] (d) Federal Register, May 26, 1998, Part II, Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Parts 148 to 271, Land Disposal Restrictions Phase IV Final Rule   These data discrepancies are in the range of many orders-of-magnitude. 

Fundamentally, any treatment plan and applied technology for remediation must be based on reliable waste stream data.  Otherwise, DOE will face another fiasco that occurred at the INEEL  Pit-9 waste treatment program that was eventually terminated because of (among other reasons) inadequate waste characterization.  An issue stressed in the comments below, and apparently ignored by DOE and the regulators, is that both the TAN V-Tank liquid and the sludge (tank heels) and contaminated soil  must be include in the calculus of determining an appropriate remediation treatment technology and the selection of waste disposal sites.

                  Additionally, the 2003 Plan fails to address all the tanks and other “buried” TAN waste issues.

Only four of the V-Tanks are addressed (30,400 gal.) when there are at least six V-Tanks (additional 100,000 gal.) and other TAN waste discharge sites with major radioactive and hazardous waste contaminates. 

These crucial issues add to the public’s skepticism about DOE’s veracity to tell the truth about its radioactive and hazardous waste crisis, in addition to the regulators willingness to adequately enforce the law that if appropriately applied, would appear to prohibit disposal of this waste on the INEEL site as DOE plans.

Therefore, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as regulators (in keeping with the Settlement Agreement that included “alpha emitting mixed low-level waste” be shipped to a geologic repository out of Idaho), [4]  must not allow this remediation program to proceed until DOE provides credible justification for the radically reduced waste stream characterization data, and the regulators offer credible analysis that the waste treatment and disposal will comply with all environmental regulations.  Moreover, the public must then be fully appraised via a new revised Plan, so that informed decisions can be made concerning the remediation alternatives.

 

II.     TAN V-Tank Contaminates of Concern

 

This discussion is an amalgam of previous (12/98) Environmental Defense Institute comments on TAN with current (4/03) remediation plan Comments in addition to EDI comments on the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) because of overlaps of Operational Units (OU), and DOE’s intent to dump the TAN waste at the ICDF.  Due to the long half-life of the radionuclides and the no-half-life of hazardous chemicals of concern at TAN, there is no credible reason that in the intervening four years there has been any reduction in the waste due to “decay.” [5]
 

The 2003 TAN plan contains data is radically (orders of magnitude) inconsistent with earlier DOE data.  Neither DOE nor the regulators offer any evidence justifying these crucial data discrepancies.
 

The 2003 Plan notes the maximum concentration for V-Tanks 1,2,3, and 9, are compared to DOE’s 1998 data on the same tanks for a few select contaminates in the Table A below.

 

Table A (see footnote # 1)

 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

 

Since DOE plans to dump V-Tank highly contaminated soils into the tank to absorb the liquid portion of the tank contents, this will add to the total tank contaminate levels.  Addition of soil to dilute the concentration of the waste is expressively prohibited in RCRA (40 CFR 268.3). The 2003 Plan acknowledges transuranic waste in the V-Tanks at 26.4 nCi/g (page 6) which is 2 ½ times higher than the greater than 10 nCi/g waste acceptance restriction for the ICDF. [6]
 

Additionally, a credible argument can be made that both the tank liquid and the sludge must be combined to determine if the waste elevates to the category of transuranic waste.  The regulatory definition of transuranic radioactive waste is 100 nano curies per gram (nCi/g) of elements with an atomic number greater than 92 (i.e. above uranium) that also have a half-life greater than 20 years. [7]  The above table shows major discrepancies in the sampling data and also suggests that this waste is at the very least “alpha low-level” or “transuranic waste”  (assuming inclusion of both liquid and sludge (tank heels) and therefore, cannot be disposed of at INEEL as DOE plans at the ICDF. See discussion below on TAN waste disposal.
 

Federal Court Justice Edward Lodge issued a ruling on March 31, 2003 that found in favor of the State of Idaho’s contention that a 1995 Settlement Agreement/Consent Order stipulates the removal of all buried transuranic waste from INEEL.  This ruling ends a long-standing legal battle between the State and the Department of Energy over what waste was included in the Agreement.  Judge Lodge’s ruling states:

“The express language of the [Settlement] agreement, when taken as a whole, expressly requires that all transuranic waste be removed from INEEL. The parties specifically define transuranic waste without any limitation as to its location within INEEL nor any limitation to amount.  Thus the Court is able to unequivocally state that in viewing the document in the light most favorable to the United States, the plain language of Paragraph B.1 [of the Settlement Agreement] clearly represents the parties intent at the time the agreement was drafted that the United States remove all transuranic waste located at INEEL.” [8]

Additionally, the 2003 TAN Plan fails to address all the V tanks and other “buried” TAN waste issues.  Only four of the V-Tanks are addressed in the 2003 Plan when there are at least six V-Tanks with major radioactive and hazardous waste contaminates. V-Tanks 1,2,3,9,13,and 14 volumes are 130,400 gallons. [DOE/ID-10557, Vol. IV, page 9-14] See table B below.

Unfortunately, the TAN plan still fails to provide remedial solutions that meet Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARAR).  Transuranic (TRU) or Greater than Class C LLW (as defined by statute) can not be dumped at the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) under current waste acceptance criteria (WAC)  restrictions or Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations on radioactive waste dumps because they must go to a geologic repository. [9] The ICDF itself is questionably in compliance with current regulations. See section III below. The Plans offers no substantive information about discrepancy of the maximum contamination levels related to individual Operational Units (OU).  Consequently,  the general public is effectively denied essential information upon which to make their own determination of whether the preferred alternatives were appropriate. 

 

The Plan claims to be “the comprehensive” CERCLA investigation into TAN.  This is not a “comprehensive” Plan because the ANP Cask Storage Pad, the Area 10 HTRE Reactor Vessel Burial Site, and the TAN Pool have been excluded. 

An example of DOE/ID’s myopic approach is the Test Area North (TAN) Comprehensive Plan’s alternative of insitu vitrification (ISV) of the mixed hazardous/radioactive waste tanks.   In 1996, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) tried the same insitu remediation approach despite public challenges to environmental law violations. The ORNL insitu project exploded putting workers and the public at extreme risk.  The TAN tank waste characterization is similar to the buried waste in ORNL’s insitu project.   

 

Actually, the lessons learned are as much site related as they are complex wide related.   INEEL tried a ISV project a few years ago and it exploded as well, and the containment tent got fried (burned up). Similar failed ISV projects can also be found at DOE’s Hanford site. Tragically, the IDEQ and EPA, as regulators fail to inform the public about these failed ISV projects, and a member of the public may (based on inadequate information) conclude that ISV is a viable remedial technology for INEEL.
 

                                                                                                          Table B

                                                                                                                                                                                                               

Sources:

DOE 1998 Data refers to the following reports cited here and DOE’s 1998 Tan Remediation Plan ;

(a); Work Plan for Waste Area Group 1, Operable Unit 1-10, Comprehensive Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, US Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, DOE-ID-10527, March 1996. Vol I, RI/FS

(b); Comprehensive Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study for the Test Area North Operable Unit 1-10, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, US Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, DOE-ID-10557, November 1997. (RI/FS)

(c); Field Sampling Plan for Operable Unit 1-10: Test Area North, D. L. Michael, Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, March 1996, INEL-95/0304, Vol.III RI/FS..

(d) Federal Register, May 26, 1998, Part II, Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Parts 148 to 271, Land Disposal Restrictions Phase IV Final Rule

                                                                                                                                                                                                               

 

Acronyms:

LDR = Land Disposal Restrictions (40 CFR 148 through 271)

TCLP = Toxicity Characteristic Leachate Procedure (40 CFR 148 through 271)                                                                                       

UTS = Universal Treatment Standards (40 CFR 148 through 271)

PRG = Preliminary Remediation Goals (EPA cleanup goals based on risk values 12/18/96)

STP = INEEL Site Treatment Plan generated by statute requirement of the Federal Facility Compliance Act

 

For more information see Environmental Defense Institute’s Comments on Proposed Test Area North Cleanup Plan, December 1998, available on EDI’s Website, publications link.                                                                            

                                                                                                                                                            

 

III.  Issues Related to Disposal of TAN Waste at ICDF

 

The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) issued a Record of Decision in October 1999 to, among other things, construct an on-site mixed hazardous and radioactive waste dump.[10]  This decision was made within the Superfund (CERCLA) process with the concurrence of the State of Idaho and the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Initially, this was welcome news since the Environmental Defense Institute has for years criticized DOE’s illegal waste “disposal” practices in dumps that would not even meet municipal garbage landfill regulations let alone radioactive and hazardous chemical waste.  After detailed analysis of the Record of Decision, it is clear that DOE plans to repeat the mistakes of the past by siting the new dump (called the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility) (ICDF) not only in a flood zone, but over top of Idaho’s sole source Snake River Aquifer which sustains more than 200,000 families.   In short, the issue is not the construction of the new dump, but the issue is where it is to be built on the INEEL site. EDI’s position is that there are credible alternative sites on the INEEL that are not over the aquifer or in a flood zone.

Additionally, DOE is violating other environmental laws by claiming that the CERCLA process waves the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) among other laws.  Attorneys conversant in the regulations say CERCLA only waive the permitting and NEPA requirements in the direct removal and remediation of a contaminated site.  CERCLA does not in this case waive the RCRA permitting or NEPA requirements on a major $85 million ICDF dump project.  Specifically, the equivalent requirements under NEPA would require DOE to evaluate, in an Environmental Impact Statement, the credible alternative siting locations for the ICDF.  This was never done.  Yes, DOE evaluated alternatives for on-site versus off-site disposal.......but not alternative on-site locations.  Once again, the legal requirements are obfuscated not only by DOE but also by the State of Idaho and the Environmental Protection Agency.  Since this appears to be a “done deal” between DOE and the regulators, it appears the public’s only recourse is litigation.  Once again the public’s rights have been trampled.

A  review of the available US Geological Survey (USGS) reports related to INEEL flooding scenarios and flood control infrastructures, it is clear that DOE and the regulators ignored this information.  Moreover, DOE ignored USGS recommendation that additional analyses are conducted prior to any final sighting decisions are made for new waste internment and disposition of existing buried waste.  Specifically, USGS recommended a two-dimensional model to expand the 1998  USGS one-dimension model  to include the upper 95% confidence flow estimates of 11,600 cubic feet per second for the Big Lost River 100-year flood, and include modeling for the upper range limit of the 500-year estimated flow rate in the Big Lost River flood plain on the INEEL. 

DOE is constructing the ICDF as a step toward meeting regulatory requirements in the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle-C hazardous waste disposal criteria. After 25 years of thumbing its nose at RCRA, DOE finally is making a gesture toward compliance after five decades of mismanagement of its waste streams that cause massive environmental contamination.  Estimated cleanup costs of this INEEL debacle are in the range of $19 billion that will come out of our pockets as taxpayers.  DOES’ decision to finally comply with RCRA is marred by the wrongheaded choice of location, when other on-site locations would not pose the same risks to the aquifer that is already severely contaminated from INEEL waste.

DOE is constructing the ICDF immediately south of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) also now called INTEC mainly for economic reasons.  It is close to the ICPP where much of the waste will be generated and it is near/over existing waste water percolation ponds which are on the Superfund cleanup list, and it is over extensive soil contamination caused from ICPP stack releases.  In other words, “kill three wasted birds with one stone.” 

The US Geological Survey released a 1998 report that modeled the median  100-year flow rates in the Big Lost River (that flows by the ICPP) down stream of the INEEL Diversion Dam (6,220 cf/s).  The USGS report cross section number 22 at the ICPP puts the median flood elevation at 4,912 feet.[11]  Again, this is only the mean flow rate (as opposed to the maximum rate of 11,600 cf/s) of just a 100-year flood, and not including any additional cascading events like the failure of Mackey Dam. The USGS flood map shows the northern half of the ICPP under water.  There are only five-foot differences between the ICDF (south end of ICPP) elevation of 4,917 feet and the USGS predicted elevation of 4,912 feet through the middle of the ICPP. The USGS study also employed current modeling techniques and plotted 37 separate cross sections on the INEEL site.  The ICPP as a whole is about as flat as a table top with only a couple feet change in elevation north to south.[12]  The crucial point here is that even the slightest variation in a Big Lost River flood would put the ICDF underwater assuming the dump was on the surface.  Proportionally less variation in floods would inundate the dump the deeper the ICDF is buried below the surrounding terrain.

An earlier USGS study in 1996 also estimated the flow range for the Big Lost River at the INEEL;   “The upper and lower 95-percent confidence limits for the estimated 100-year peak flow were 11,600 and 3,150 cubic feet per second (cf/s), respectively.” [13]

Since 1950, INEEL has experienced significant flooding events (localized and site-wide) in1962, 1965, 1969, 1982, and 1984.  In an effort to mitigate the flooding problem, DOE built a diversion dam on the Big Lost River that is designed to shunt flood waters to the south and away from INEEL facilities.  USGS’s 1998 report that modeled the mean (midrange) 100-year flow rate of 7,260 cf/s upstream of the INEEL diversion dam. USGS estimated that the Big Lost median flow rate downstream of the diversion dam at 6,220 cf/s with a thousand cf/s going down the diversion channel for a total median flow rate of 7,260 cf/s upstream of the INEEL diversion dam. [14]  “This peak flow was routed down stream [of the Big Lost River] as if the INEEL diversion dam did not exist.  On the basis of a structural analysis of the INEEL diversion dam (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) assumed the dam incapable of retaining high flows.  The Corps indicated that the diversion dam could fail if flows were to exceed 6,000 cubic feet per second.”[15] 

This USGS study acknowledged that the northern half of the ICPP would be flooded with four feet of moving water, even at this midrange (mean) flow rate. If ICDF excavation goes two feet below present surfaces, it will be below the elevation of the mean 100 year flood zone. Plans are to excavate ICDF pits most of the entire 50 feet to bedrock.
 

Since the radioactive waste will be extremely hazardous for tens of thousands of years and flooding will flush contaminates down into the aquifer, a conservative risk assessment would model the upper 95-percent confidence limits for the estimated 100-year peak flow of 11,600 cf/s.  USGS has proposed this additional research to DOE, but the Department is not willing to provide the funding. A USGS hydrologist notes,  “The flow of 11,600 cfs represents the upper 95 percent confidence limit flow for the estimated 100-year peak flow (Kjelstrom and Berenbrock, 1996, p6). Future modeling needs are to model the area with this flow.  We’ve expressed this to the INEEL and also have expressed that the WSPRO model used has limitations and that an application of more stringent models (two dimensional) is needed to refine and better delineate the extent of possible flooding of the Big Lost River.” [16] 

USGS estimates the mean 500-year Big Lost River flood rates at 9,680 cf/s (34% greater flow rate than the mean 100 year flood).[17]  This 500-year flood would inundate the ICPP and surrounding area.   These potential hazards are being ignored when making hazardous mixed radioactive waste internment decisions in these vulnerable areas despite the long-term consequences and the potential for additional aquifer contamination.

Cascading events also are not considered. This is known as a worst-case scenario where one event triggers another event.  For instance a 500-Year flood  plus failure of Mackay Dam (built in 1917) resulting in estimated flows of 9,700 + 54,000 cubic feet per second respectively would be an example of a cascading event. Failure of Mackey Dam is non-speculative in view of the 1976 failure of the Teton Dam of similar construction and the fact that Mackey Dam lies within 11 miles of a major earthquake fault line that produced the 1983 Borah Peak 7.3 magnitude quake.   An internal 1986 DOE report that analyzed the impact of Mackey Dam failure scenarios notes that, “Mackay Dam was not built to conform to seismic or hydrologic design criteria,” and  ”the dam has experienced significant under seepage since its construction.” [18]  This EG&G study acknowledged that the ICPP, Navel Reactors Facility, and the Test Area North (LOFT) facilities would be flooded with at least four feet of water moving at three feet per second.

USGS did not consider cascading events but noted previous studies showing that failure of Mackay Dam alone would result in 6 feet of water at the INEEL Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) waste burial grounds. Other studies recognized by USGS note that,  “Rathburn (1989, 1991) estimated that the depth of water at the RWMC, resulting from a paleo-flood [early] of 2 to 4 million cf/s in the Big Lost River in Box Canyon and overflow areas, was 50-60 feet.”  “If Mackey Dam failed, Niccum estimated that peak flow at the ICPP would be at 30,000 cfs.”  [19]  Comparing these flow rates with the USGS estimate 100-year mean flow of 6,220 cfs that would flood the north end of the ICPP with four feet of water, and a Mackey Dam failure becomes a real disaster potential with respect to the existing underground waste tanks and underground spent reactor fuel storage at the ICPP.

DOE is relying extensively on the Big Lost River Diversion Dam (located at the western INEEL boundary) to shunt major flood waters away from INEEL facilities.  The last comprehensive analysis of this diversion dike system (below the diversion dam) was conducted by USGS in 1986 in a report titled Capacity of the Diversion Channel below the Flood Control Dam on the Big Lost River at the INEL.  In this study USGS estimated a mean flow rate of 9,300 cf/s, 7,200 of which went into the diversion channel and “2,100 cf/s will pass through two low swells west of the main channel for a combined maximum diversion capacity of 9,300 cf/s.  A sustained flow at or above 9,300 cf/s could damage or destroy the dike banks by erosion.  Overflow will first top the containment dike at cross section 1, located near the downstream control structure on the diversion dam.”  [20]  This USGS study did not analyze the construction of the diversion dikes but they would likely fail as did the upstream diversion dam, built at the same time, that the Army Corps of Engineers found structurally deficient.  “On the basis of a structural analysis of the INEEL diversion dam (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, written comments, 1997), the dam was assumed incapable of retaining high flows.  The Corps indicated that the diversion dam could fail if flows were to exceed 6,000 cf/s.  Possible failure mechanisms are: (1) erosion of the upstream face of the dam that results from high-flow velocities and loss of slope protections (rip-rap), (2) overtopping of the diversion dam by flows exceeding the capacity of the diversion channel and culverts, (3) piping and breaching of the diversion dam because of seepage around the culverts, and (4) instability of the dam and its foundation because of seepage.”[21]

Failure of the diversion dam and/or the diversion channel dikes would also directly impact the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) waste burial grounds.  A 1976 USGS report notes,  “The burial ground is within 2 miles (3.2 km) of the Big Lost River and the surface is approximately 40 feet (12 m) lower than the present river channel. Sediments in the burial ground contain grains and pebbles of limestone and quartzite, suggesting that in recent geologic past, flood waters of the Big Lost River flowed through the burial ground basin.  Two eroded notches or ‘wind-gaps’ in the basalt ridge bordering the west of the burial ground also suggest past Big Lost River floods.”  “A large diversion system on the Big Lost River was constructed by the AEC to control flood waters by diverting water into ponding  Areas A, B, C, and D.  The nearest of these, Area B is less than a mile [south] from and about 30 feet (9m) higher in elevation than the burial ground.” [22] 

USGS Arco Hills SE and Big Southern Butte quadrangle topographic maps clearly show the RWMC flooding vulnerability as do other USGS reports that note,  “If [diversion] dike 2 [at ponding Area B] fails, large flows will drain directly toward the solid radioactive waste burial grounds.” [23]  These vulnerabilities must be taken into consideration when DOE attempts to leave the buried transuranic waste at the RWMC and not exhume and relocate it to a safe permanent repository.
 

Building dams around the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) as was done at the RWMC is not an acceptable flood protection answer because lateral water migration will go under the dams and local precipitation will be held in exacerbating the leachate conditions.  The liner of the ICDF will not be capable of maintaining integrity with the increased hydraulic pressure during a flood because liners are only capable of blocking what minimal surface water may leak past the cap and infiltrate the waste.  There are good legitimate reasons why dumps (even municipal garbage dumps) are not allowed by statute in flood zones or above sole source aquifers.  Dams by definition are only functional if there is regular maintenance which cannot be assumed once DOE ends institutional control of INEEL in a hundred years.  Dumping the waste on top of the ground and mounding the cover over it will result in the cap eroding over the long-term which, again, is unacceptable. Regulator’s contention that there is a degree of efficiency in co-locating the ICDF with the ICPP percolation ponds that they must be remediated along with the “windblown” soil contamination area around the percolation ponds not only defies common sense but is also illegal.
 

DOE must designate another location for the ICDF that is not near a flood plain and not over the aquifer.  DOE’s own study has identified at least two such sites (on the INEEL) where the Lemi Range meets the Snake River Plain. [24]  DOE has not seriously considered these alternative sites as would normally be required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), stating that the sites were eliminated from consideration due to increased seismic activity. There is no documented evidence of this alternative site analysis.  No empirical risk assessment was conducted to compare the relative risk of a location over a sole source aquifer and in a flood plain (ICPP) as opposed to a site with a slightly higher seismic risk not over the aquifer or in a flood zone (Lemhi Range terminus). Other credible options include purchasing land contiguous to the northern end of the INEEL  site near the terminus of the Bitterroot Range that also would be off the aquifer and not in a flood zone and have more soil cover over the bedrock. 
 

Another misguided project outlined in DOE’s October 1999 Record of Decision is the construction of new ICPP process waste percolation ponds midway between ICPP and Central Facilities Area to the south.  For a detailed analysis of this project see the Environmental Defense Institute’s Ground Water Contamination at INEEL Report available at http://home.earthlink.net/~edinst/

Nuclear Regulatory Commission restrictions prohibiting citing radioactive waste disposal dumps on 100 year flood plains must be observed. [ NRC 10 CFR ss 61.50 The reason for these restrictions is because the flood water will leach the contaminates out of the waste and flush the pollution more rapidly into the aquifer.  Since these wastes will remain toxic for tens of thousands of years, they must be disposed of responsibly in a safe permanent repository.  These issues must be kept in mind also with respect to the ICPP high-level waste tanks that are some forty feet underground as well as the underground spent reactor fuel storage and calcine storage bins at the ICPP.  Water acts as a moderator and if the underground spent fuel vaults are flooded, it could cause a criticality.  All of these underground high-level waste sites are extremely vulnerable. Former ICPP workers recall stacking sandbags six feet high around the plant during a Spring flood about ten years ago.  The added external hydrologic pressure on the high-level waste tank concrete vaults could collapse the vaults and the tanks inside, and thus release the contents. These risks must be considered when DOE decides to leave the high-level waste tank sediments permanently in place as a cost cutting measure.
 

The ICDF sighting, engineering design, and waste acceptance criteria (WAC) must be developed with public involvement through a free and open discussion.  The legal requirements of the process are spelled out in the National Environmental Policy Act that requires Environmental Impact Statements and public hearings.  Only un-containerized wastes that can be compacted during placement should be allowed so as to minimize subsidence caused by container decomposition. Biodegradable, VOC, collapsible, soluble, TRU, or Greater than Class C Low-level, and Alpha-low-level waste must also be excluded from the ICDF dump and sent off-site.  Prior to completing the ICDF Title II Design, workshops should be convened for stakeholders to comment on the proposal in addition to the NEPA requirements.   Waste Acceptance Criteria maximum contaminate concentration levels must be determined from waste sampling prior to being mixed with any stabilizing materials.  In other words, ”dilution is not the solution to pollution”.   
 

USGS reports identified factors favoring downward waste migration.  “In order for waste isotopes to be carried downward by water, four basic requirements are needed: 1.) availability of water, 2.) contact of the water with the waste, 3.) solubility or suspendability of the waste in water, 4.) permeability in the geologic media to allow water flow downward.” [25]  This USGS report describes in detail how all four conditions are met at INEEL including the solubility factor where they note “Hagan and Miner (1970) leached five different categories of solid waste from Rocky Flats [the main source of plutonium in the RWMC] with ground water from the INEL and Rocky Flats and measured the plutonium concentrations and pH of the leachate.  They found the highest Pu-239 concentration in leachates from the acidic-graphite wastes, 62,000 to 80,000 ug/l plutonium or (3.8 x 10 ⁹ to 4.9 x 10 ⁹  pCi/L).” [Ibid]
 

The most reliable indicators of contaminate migration are onsite sampling data. Cesium-137, plutonium-238,-239,-240 were all found at the 240 foot interbeds under the RWMC. [IDO-22056@74]  Forty-one % of the samples from the 240 foot interbeds contained radio­nuclides. [Ibid.@87]  Other litera­ture confirmation of plutonium at 240 feet in­cludes: "Radio­nuclides (including Pu-238.-239.-240, Am-241, Cs-137, Sr-90) have been detected in soils and in sedimentary interbeds to a depth of 240 feet beneath the RWMC, (Hodge et al, 1989)."  "Posi­tive values for Pu-238,-239,-240 were detected in samples obtained from the 240 foot interbed in bore hole DO2."[DOE/ID-10183@134-145][DOE/ID/12082(88) @14-16]   Radio­nuclides are also con­firmed in the aquifer ­under the RWMC. [EG&G-WTD-9438@25] USGS water sampling data at the 600 foot levels, expressed in pico curies per liter (pCi/l) show:
 

For more information on the contaminate migration from INEEL buried waste see EDI website publication on “Snake River Aquifer at Risk”.   http://perosonalpages.tds.net/~edinst
 

In summary of Section III, ICDF site selection is illegal under statutes Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rules that prohibit sighting of radioactive waste dumps in 100 year flood plains (10 CFR 61.50) which the agencies are obliged to conform to if their commitment to Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement (ARAR) is genuine

This particular argument revolves around the fundamental definition of the 100-yr flood zone.  USGS conducted an extensive study in 1998 that defined the upper and lower 95% confidence level on the flow rates for a 100-year flood.

            1. The upper rate is estimated at 11,600 cfs and the lower rate is 3,150 cfs

2. USGS chose for some unknown reason (perhaps pressure from DOE) to plot only the mean flow rate (average between upper and lower) of 6,220 cfs

3. USGS assumptions base on previous Army Corps of Engineers and other EG&G studies that the Diversion Dam would fail with flows in excess of 6,000 cfs so the diversion dam was mostly discounted.

4. USGS plotting of the mean 100 year flow rate does not define the flood zone.  It only shows where the likely areas that will be affected during an average flood.  This mean plot should never be used for making major facility siting decisions.

5.  The appropriate definition of the 100-year flood zone is to plot the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate, which USGS attempted to convince DOE to fund, but were refused funding.

6. No credible empirical rationale can be presented to define the 100-year flood zone based on the plotting of the mean flow rate as DOE and the regulators are doing.

7. Given that the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate is nearly twice what the mean flow rate .......this is a significant spread. 

 

The apparent top of the ICDF berm is about 10 feet above the USGS plotted mean of the 100-year flood at INTEC.  Absent a through USGS study that plots the upper level flow rate and the resultant flooding given the near level topography of the INTEC environs, there is a lot of uncertainty about whether the berm is high enough. 

Additional uncertainty is the ability of the berm to survive the three feet per second rush of the flood and the erosion that would be expected to occur.
 

The ten-foot berm would also be expected to erode over time from natural wind and precipitation which would eliminate that minimal flood barrier.  Who is going to be around in 200 years to maintain that berm?  If the berm was breached, is the liner adequate to maintain integrity with a hydraulic head of nearly 50 feet? 
 

500-year flood MEAN is estimated at 9,600 cfs.....Claims of 1,000 year durability of ICDF mandates inclusion of the 500 year flood impact. Cascading event of Macky Dam.....++ 54,000 cfs

Cost benefit analysis did not take into account long term impact on the potential further contamination of the sole source Snake River Aquifer and how it would affect health and safety not to mention agriculture.